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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze content sharing between news
sources in the alternative and mainstream media using a
dataset of 713K articles and 194 sources. We find that content
sharing happens in tightly formed communities, and these
communities represent relatively homogeneous portions of
the media landscape. Through a mix-method analysis, we
find several primary content sharing behaviors. First, we find
that the vast majority of shared articles are only shared with
similar news sources (i.e. same community). Second, we find
that despite these echo-chambers of sharing, specific sources,
such as The Drudge Report, mix content from both main-
stream and conspiracy communities. Third, we show that
while these differing communities do not always share news
articles, they do report on the same events, but often with
competing and counter-narratives. Overall, we find that the
news is homogeneous within communities and diverse in be-
tween, creating different spirals of sameness.
1 Introduction
Researchers in Communications have studied content shar-
ing in journalism for quite some time (Boczkowski 2010;
Graber 1971; Noelle-Neumann and Mathes 1987; Shoe-
maker and Reese 2013). This long line of research has
shown that news organizations often imitate each other in
order to be competitive and meet demand. Various reasons
for this behavior have been discussed, such as the popular-
ity of the Internet (Mitchelstein and Boczkowski 2010) and
changes in the news demand structure (Boczkowski 2010).
This behavior was even discussed as early as the 1950’s,
where it was said that “many newspapers feature the same
news stories atop their front pages (Boczkowski 2010; Breed
1955).” It has been argued that because of this increased con-
tent copying, the news has become homogeneous and sig-
nificantly less diverse (Boczkowski 2010; Klinenberg 2005;
Glasser 1992).
However, today this homogenized view of the news has
been complicated by the rise of “alternative” media. Specifi-
cally, the rise of false, hyper-partisan, and propagandist news
producers has created a media landscape where there are
competing narratives around the same event (Starbird 2017)
and no gatekeepers to curate quality information (Reese,
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Vos, and Shoemaker 2009; Allcott and Gentzkow 2017;
Mele et al. 2017). Thus, we may have a more diverse set of
news to read than in years past, but the standards of quality
have wavered, creating a new set of concerns.
This rise in low-quality and potentially malicious news
producers has been the focus of many recent studies such
as those focusing on detecting false content (Potthast et al.
2017; Popat et al. 2016; Singhania, Fernandez, and Rao
2017; Horne et al. 2018; Baly et al. 2018). Some other stud-
ies have focused on the tactics used to spread low-quality
news, such as the use of social bots (Shao et al. 2017)
and the structures of headlines to get higher attention and
clicks (Horne and Adalı 2017; Chakraborty et al. 2016). One
lesser studied area of the alternative media universe is con-
tent sharing (or content republishing, imitation, replication).
While in the past content sharing in the mainstream media
was used to meet demand, be timely, and keep up with com-
peting news agencies, it may be used more maliciously in
today’s news environment. For example, just as bot-driven
misinformation in social networks, content sharing can be
used to make particular stories or narratives seem more im-
portant, more widely reported, and thus, more credible.
In this paper, we begin to explore this behavior. Specifi-
cally, we analyze content sharing on a large dataset (713K
articles and 194 sources) across both the mainstream and
alternative landscapes, with news sources of varying verac-
ity. We show that, when formulated as a network, news pro-
ducers share content in tightly connected communities. Fur-
thermore, these communities represent distinct parts of the
media ecosystem, such as U.S. mainstream media, left-wing
blogs, and right-wing conspiracy media. With this commu-
nity framework, we employ mix-methods analysis to bet-
ter understand what types of content sharing behavior ex-
ist within and between these communities. We observe four
primary practices in this data. First, news content is often
replicated in echo-chambers, where the copied content is
only published by other producers within the community.
This may mean a high quality investigative piece of re-
porting or a wild conspiracy theory may be equally copied
within the network that originated it. Second, despite the
tight community structure of the content sharing network,
specific sources mix content from both mainstream news
and conspiracy news. This behavior illustrates a dangerous
practice, which can falsely elevate the perceived credibil-
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ity of conspiracy-spreading sources. Third, many news arti-
cles are not shared across communities, but the broad topics
and events featured in the articles can be very similar, many
times in the form of competing contemporaneous narratives.
Lastly, we observe a more unique behavior in which the con-
spiracy media reacts to a mistake in the mainstream media,
ultimately providing a reason to distrust the mainstream me-
dia.
Overall, we find that the homogeneous view of news (or
to borrow a term from (Boczkowski 2010): “spiral of same-
ness”) still exist, but those “spirals of sameness” are, for the
most part, different in each distinct parts of the news ecosys-
tem. Within the same community, multiple processes work
simultaneously to amplify certain narratives around current
events as well as to undermine the credibility of some high
quality news outlets. In essence, this ”spiral of sameness”
now also actively works to create a type of otherness that
feeds the creation of more divisive news and an overall con-
fusing information environment.
2 Related Work
There are two recent studies that have focused on content
sharing in today’s media ecosystem. The first study on con-
tent sharing in alternative media focuses on a specific topic
in 2016: the Syrian Civil Defense (Starbird et al. 2018). This
study uses mix-methods to analyze the content replication
practices by alternative news sites reporting on various as-
pects of the Syrian Civil Defense. The authors used Twit-
ter as a the starting point of the data collection, and ex-
tended to the websites cited in the Twitter data. With this
data, the authors demonstrated the spread of competing nar-
ratives through content sharing. They found that the alterna-
tive news sources had both news-wire as well as news ag-
gregator type services. Additionally, they found that a small
number of authors generate content that is spread widely
in the alternative news. They also found that government-
funded media were prevalent in the production these anti-
White Helmet narratives.
The second study approaches content republishing from a
more general setting (Horne and Adalı 2018). Specifically,
the authors collected news data from 92 news sources, that
included both mainstream and alternative news. The articles
collected were not focused on any specific topic as was done
in the study discussed above (Starbird 2017). Horne and
Adalı collected this data live from each news source, and
thus, were able to gather timestamps with each article. With
this data, they created directed networks of news sources,
where each edge represents some number of nearly identical
articles. They found that despite many articles being copied
verbatim, the headlines of the articles often changed. These
headline changes differed between the alternative media and
the mainstream media, where the alternative media often
changed emotional tone and the mainstream media often
change structural features. Furthermore, the authors found
that most alternative content is written by very few authors,
just as was found in (Starbird 2017).
In contrast to the two previous works, our work uses a
much larger dataset that covers a long period of time and a
large number of topics/events. Additionally, our analysis in-
corporates both exact and partial matching algorithms, pro-
viding a more extended look at content sharing than the
previous two studies. Lastly, we utilize external credibility
and bias assessments to better characterize the sources who
are sharing content, which allows us to conduct extensive
new case studies that have not been shown in the literature.
We hope that this work, in combination with these previous
works, can be a strong building-block in developing theory
about content sharing as a disinformation tactic.
3 Methods
Data
We collected articles from a broad spectrum of sources. We
scraped the RSS feeds of each news source twice a day start-
ing on 02/02/2018 using the Python libraries feedparser and
goose. For source selection, we start with mainstream outlets
(from both the U.S. and the U.K.) and alternative sources
that are mentioned in other misinformation studies (Starbird
2017; Horne and Adalı 2018; Baly et al. 2018). We then
use the Google Search API to expand the number of sources
in the collection. Specifically, we query Google with the ti-
tles of the previously collected articles and add any source
that appears in the top 10 pages of Google and is not al-
ready in our collection list. This process is repeated until we
have a large sample of sources from both mainstream and
alternative news. In addition to scraping article content, we
capture the UTC timestamp of when the article was pub-
lished. Note, we do not include small local news sources or
sources that did not have operational RSS feeds, which sig-
nificantly reduces the size of the expected source set. Our
final dataset contains 194 sources with over 713K articles
between 02/02/2018 and 11/30/2018. Since this collection
process happens multiple times a day, we have nearly every
article published by a source after it is added to the collec-
tion.
Building Content Sharing Networks
Once our data collection is complete, we construct a ver-
batim content sharing network. We take a similar, but more
refined, approach to (Horne and Adalı 2018).
We employ a three step method to build the network:
1. We build a Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency
(TFIDF) matrix for each 5 day period in the dataset. For
each pair of article vectors, we compute the cosine simi-
larity between them. Following the same process in (Star-
bird et al. 2018) and (Horne and Adalı 2018), we choose
article pairs with cosine similarity of 0.85 or above. These
extracted article pairs are nearly identical, excluding po-
tentially different interpretations of the same story. The 5
day window is used for computational reasons, to reduce
the size of pairwise comparison matrix.
2. For each pair, we order them by the UTC timestamp, as
to create directed edges from the original article to the
copied article.
3. Each article that is a copy, can only copy from one original
article, but an article being copied can be copied by mul-
tiple other news sources. Thus, if multiple pairs were ex-
tracted (i.e. 4 verbatim articles would create 12 unordered
pairs, 6 ordered pairs after timestamp ordering), we match
a copying article to an older article with highest cosine
similarity. If there are ties, we pick the oldest article as
the original article.
After this process, we perform some manual verification
of pairs, as some UTC timestamps are slightly off due to
a news source updating or republishing an article. Once we
are confident in the article pairs, we build a directed network,
where nodes are news sources and edges are articles copied
between the sources. Each edge is weighted by the num-
ber of articles copied and is directed from original source to
the source that copied. We find that 160 sources out of the
194 sources in the dataset copied an article or had an article
copied from them at least once during the 10 month period.
Finding Communities
Next, we use the modularity maximization algorithm de-
signed specifically for directed networks (Leicht and New-
man 2008) to determine communities in the network. This
algorithm uses simple network statistics to compute prob-
abilities of edges between a set of nodes. The modularity
score is a measurement of how improbable the distribution
of edges within a set of communities are, compared to the
distribution based on the simple statistics. By maximizing
the modularity, we find communities which have a surpris-
ingly high number of internal edges when compared to the
expectation. The python implementation we used1 deter-
mines both the number of communities as well as the com-
munities themselves. The network can be found in Figure 1
and is colored with the detected communities.
Credible Not Credible Unknown
O 3 (8%) 2 (5%) 34 (87%)
Y 9 (27%) 5 (15%) 19 (57%)
G 26 (74%) 2 (6%) 7 (20%)
M 8 (47%) 0 (0%) 9 (53%)
C 5 (14%) 0 (0%) 30 (86%)
Table 1: Number of sources in each community within
the three main labels of NewsGuard. Unknown means the
source has not been labeled by NewsGuard, this does not
necessarily mean they are unreliable sources.
Characterizing Communities
In order to better understand what types of sources exist
in each community, we utilize source-level analyses done
by several platforms: NewsGuard2, Media Bias Fact Check3
1zhiyzuo.github.io/python-modularity-maxim
ization/
2newsguardtech.com
3mediabiasfactcheck.com
O 6 (15%) 5 (13%) 4 (10%) 24 (62%)
Y 4 (12%) 1 (3%) 23 (70%) 5 (15%)
G 14 (40%) 12 (34%) 5 (14%) 4 (11%)
M 10 (59%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 6 (35%)
C 7 (20%) 11 (31%) 4 (11%) 13 (37%)
Table 2: Counts of political leaning of sources in each com-
munity, based on data from Media Bias / Fact Check. The
leanings are left, center, right and unknown.
O 21 (54%) 0 (0%) 8 (21%) 7 (18%) 3 (8%)
Y 31 (94%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 0 (0%)
G 31 (89%) 2 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%)
M 16 (94%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
C 7 (20%) 22 (63%) 2 (6%) 1 (3%) 3 (9%)
Table 3: Counts of countries of origin for sources in each
community. The countries are USA, Russia,
United Kingdom, unknown country and other coun-
tries (Canada, Cyprus, France, Germany, New Zealand,
Qatar, Ukraine or Venezuela)
(MBFC), Allsides4, and an article published by BuzzFeed5.
NewsGuard uses a large team of trained journalists to re-
view news outlets, in order to inform readers about the sites,
as well as organizations who work with or publish ads on
the news sites. NewsGuard assesses nine journalistic criteria
which are combined into a green (good) or a red label (bad).
MBFC is a platform that analyzes news sources to deter-
mine their credibility using trained team. We combine their
factual-reporting score with NewsGuard’s credibility label,
for a final label of source reliability. We aggregate by nor-
malizing both scores from -1 to 1 and adding them. Sources
with a score less than -0.6 we label ”Not Credible”, sources
with scores above 0.6 we label ”Credible”, and sources in
between are labelled ”Unknown”. The threshold of 0.6 is in-
spired from NewsGuards methodology. Table 1 shows the
aggregation of these credibility ratings within each of the
communities.
In addition to credibility ratings, MBFC provides a de-
scriptive label for sites, which often includes the source’s
political bias across the political spectrum from left to right
(using 5 levels). Allsides is another expert-based assessment
site, which similarly labels sources with one of 5 levels of
bias across the political spectrum from left to right. Finally,
BuzzFeed has published a dataset with political leaning of
sources, using binary label of either left or right. Using these
three political bias assessments, we aggregate a bias score
for each source by normalizing each rating from -1 (left) to
1 (right) and adding them. We threshold the scores so that
4allsides.com
5https://bit.ly/2OoYztU
score ≤ −1 is considered left-leaning, −1 < score < 1 is
considered center and 1 ≤ score is considered right-leaning.
Table 2 shows the aggregation the the bias ratings.
4 Network Analysis Results
Using our constructed network, we assess the community
structure and the traits of the sources within each com-
munity to better understand content-sharing. In Figure 1,
we show the network of content sharing, where each
color represents a community. In Table 4, we show some
basic statistics about each community in the network. Our
primary results are discussed below.
Content sharing communities represent distinct parts
of the media. In Table 1, we show the breakdown of
credibility in each community, in Table 2, we show the
breakdown of source political leaning, and in Table 3, we
show the breakdown of source country in each community.
Using these three tables, we can see some clear differences
between each community. The green ( G ) community
is 89% U.S. based and 74% of its sources are credible.
This community contains many recognizable mainstream
sources, such as AP News, USA Today, NPR, and PBS. The
cyan ( C ) community contains 63% U.K. based sources
and contains many recognizable mainstream sources such
as Reuters, The Independent, and BBC. The magenta ( M )
community contains 94% U.S. based sources that are mostly
left leaning. Several of these sources are self-proclaimed
liberal blogs, such as Crooks and Liars, RightWingWatch,
and Daily Kos. The yellow ( Y ) community is 94% U.S.
based and 70% right leaning. It contains several well-known
conspiracy sources, such as Infowars and The Gateway
Pundit, as well as many hyper-partisan sources that have
published false information in the past, such as The Drudge
Report and Breitbart. Lastly, and maybe most interesting,
the orange ( O ) community contains 21% Russian and 54%
U.S. biased sources. It contains 5% sources that are marked
as not credible and 87% unknown credibility. Many of the
sources are recognizable Russian state-sponsored sources,
such as RT and Sputnik, while others are anti-semitic media
sources, such as Daily Stormer and JewWorldOrder. In ad-
dition to this, there are several right-wing conspiracy sites,
such as The D.C. Clothesline, The American Conservative,
Natural News, Prison Planet, and Newswars.
In the following discussion, we will refer to the commu-
nities as:
O Russian/conspiracy community
Y Right-wing/conspiracy community
G U.S. mainstream community
M Left-wing blog community
C U.K. mainstream community
Note, there are a few unexpected nodes in the U.S.
mainstream community and the right-wing/conspiracy
community. Namely, Trump Times in the U.S. mainstream
community and The Atlantic, MSNBC, and The New York
Times in the right-wing/conspiracy community. There are
a few reasons this happens in the network. First, Trump
Times, a fairly new right-wing blog, only copies articles
from Fox News, which is a right-leaning mainstream news
source. Second, unexpectedly, The Atlantic, MSNBC, and
The New York Times are all copied multiple times by
right-wing sources in the right-wing/conspiracy community.
These sources include The Drudge Report, Red State, and
Hot Air. The subjects of these articles copied are mostly
President Donald Trump’s speeches and data privacy. These
sources are also heavily copied by members of the green
community and members of the magenta community (as
expected), but not as much as they are copied by members
of the right-wing/conspiracy community. The Atlantic,
MSNBC, and The New York Times do not copy from
any members of the right-wing/conspiracy community.
To further show these sources are peripheral nodes in the
network, we compute the k-core of each community, shown
in Table 5. The k-core is the maximal subgraph that contains
nodes of degree k or more, which should indicate what
sources are most tightly connected in each community. We
see that all 4 of these sources do not fall into the k-core of
their given communities.
News-wire services and news aggregators come in
all flavors. For the most part, each community has its
own news-wire-like services, just as was found in (Star-
bird et al. 2018). The U.S. mainstream community has AP
News, the U.K. mainstream community has Reuters, and
the Russian/conspiracy community has Tass. In the right-
wing/conspiracy community, there is not a formal news-wire
service as in the other communities, but it seems that West-
ern Journal and Conservative Tribune (which are owned by
the same parent company) act as news-wires to much of the
community. However, it is also the case that they aggregate
many things from both U.S. mainstream media and hyper-
partisan right sources.
Similarly, we see that each community has one or more
news aggregators. The U.S. mainstream community has
Yahoo News and Mail (www.mail.com), the right-
wing/conspiracy community has The Drudge Report and
True Pundit, and the Russian/conspiracy community has
The Russophile (a self-proclaimed alternative news aggre-
gator) and sott.net (the self-proclaimed “leading alternative
news site”).
Hyper-partisan right sources share content more than
hyper-partisan left sources. It is clear that the right-
wing/conspiracy community is much larger than the left-
wing blog community (33 sources vs. 17 sources). How-
ever, there is a much more balanced set of left and right
sources in the full dataset. This finding could be due to con-
spiracy sources in our dataset being right-wing focused or
it could be due to different content sharing behavior among
the two groups. When taking a qualitative look at each group
of sources, it does seem clear that the left-wing sources
write many more long and unique opinion pieces rather than
“breaking news.” Whereas the right-wing/conspiracy com-
munity participates in more breaking news stories, rather
than opinion pieces.
Figure 1: Network of news sources, where colors indicated the community membership, size represents outdegree, and arrow
direction indicates information flow (e.g. node n’s out-degree means how many copy from n). The node layout is constructed
using Force-Atlas 2 and expansion in Gephi (gephi.org).
Orange Yellow Green Magenta Cyan
N 39 33 35 17 35
Highest Eigenvector Centrality The Russophile Drudge Report New York Post Alternet The Independent
Most External Outgoing Edges Newswars Infowars AP The Daily Beast Reuters
Most External Incoming Edges Newswars Drudge Report The Guardian Raw Story The Guardian UK
Most Internal Outgoing Edges Tass Conservative Tribune AP Alternet Reuters
Most Internal Incoming Edges The Russophile Western Journal Talking Points Memo Alternet OANN
Table 4: Metadata about each community, where “Most External Outgoing Edges” shows the node who has the highest number
of out directed edges going to nodes in another community, “Most Internal Outgoing Edges” shows the node who has the
highest number of out directed edges going to nodes in the same community, etc.
Orange Yellow Green Magenta Cyan
LewRockwell Infowars AP Salon The Sun
Prison Planet Western Journal PBS Raw Story Huffington Post UK
TheAntiMedia True Pundit CBS Hullabaloo Blog The Daily Echo
Newswars CNS News Daily Mail The Daily Beast The Independent
Russia-Insider News Busters The Huffington Post Crooks and Liars Birmingham Mail
sottnet Real Clear Politics The Guardian Media Matters The Daily Record
Mint Press News Drudge Report Chicago Sun-Times Alternet Evening Standard
The Duran National Review The Denver Post The Daily Mirror
The Russophile The Political Insider ABC Manchester Evening News
Activist Post Investors Business Daily New York Post BBC UK
Freedom-Bunker Instapundit USA Today The Guardian UK
The Daily Caller Fox News
Daily Signal Talking Points Memo
The Gateway Pundit Mercury News
Table 5: Members of the k-core of each community, where the k-core is a maximal subgraph that contains nodes of degree k or
more. In this case, we compute the “main-core” which is the core with the largest degree.
5 Extending to Partial Content Sharing
Now that we have a community framework built using
verbatim content sharing and understand its basic charac-
teristics, we extend to partial content sharing by utilizing
methods from plagiarism detection. Schleimer et al. creates
a method called “winnowing”, which is a clever combina-
tion of hashing and windowing to create fingerprints for
text (Schleimer, Wilkerson, and Aiken 2003). These finger-
prints refer to a small set of values which can be used to
identify pieces of text. The method computes the sequence
of hashes of all k-grams of characters over a text, for some
decided value of k. It then runs a window of length t over
the hashes and creates a much shorter sequence of minimum
hash-values in the windows. This sequence of hash values is
the fingerprint used to represent the document. If one com-
pares fingerprints of two documents, the overlapping hashes
will (with very high probability) be identical sequences of
text. The algorithm can also provide positions of the over-
laps in the documents. The authors prove that any sequence
of text of length t or more will be detected by the algo-
rithm. Any string of less than k will not be detected. We
used t = 25 and k = 10.
After computing fingerprints of all articles, we can very
efficiently compare documents and detect overlaps. After
detecting overlaps between two documents will analyze the
positions of the overlaps and expand to longest ranges of
identical text. We combine ranges of matched text that are
close to each other (for example, if one article has inserted an
additional word into a copied sentence). Finally we perform
two thresholds. We only keep segments of copying which
are longer than 170 characters and only consider pairs of
articles that share segments of a combined size of at least
350 characters. This process leaves us with pairs of articles
which share a considerable amount of text. The use of this
method in our analysis is describe below.
6 Mix-Method Case Studies
Using the community framework built in Section 3 and the
partial content sharing method described in Section 5, we
perform a mix-method analysis of content sharing behav-
ior in the network. Specifically, we categorize the prevalent
types of article copying that happen in the previously created
network. We first look at pairs of articles in the verbatim net-
work to characterize the copying behavior in and out of the
communities. Once we have discovered these main types of
verbatim copying, we run our partial content matching algo-
rithm to find what other articles, not in the network, spread
the given information. We continue to use the community
framework described in Section 4 to describe these findings.
We find four primary behaviors in the data:
1. Echo chambers
2. Context mixing
3. Competing narratives
4. Counter-narratives
Echo Chambers
The most common occurrence in the data were stories that
only spread in their given community. This seems fairly
clear given our first result in Section 4. In Figure 2, we
show the community-level network of our original content
sharing network, where each node represents a community,
and edges represent content sharing between the commu-
nities (or within, in the case of self-loops). In Table 6, we
show the weighted adjacency matrix of this network. For the
majority of the communities, the number of articles shared
within the community (as illustrated by the self-loop weight)
is much higher than articles copied from or copied to out-
side communities. This result should be fairly obvious as
the community detection algorithm is looking for the num-
ber of links in and between subgraphs. Most of the sto-
ries spreading only within a single community are clearly
aimed towards the given audience of each community, and
Figure 2: Community level graph where each node is 1 com-
munity. The colors correspond to the original community
colors, the size of the nodes corresponds to the number of
sources in the community, and the size of the edge arrows is
the number of copied articles between the communities.
O Y G M C
O 13395 1762 484 102 334
Y 2133 2477 225 872
G 5405 66 1480
M 266 323
C 7448
Table 6: Adjacency matrix where each element in
the matrix is the number of article pairs between
(or within) each community. Both directions of
pairs are counted.
are started by a news-wire (or news-wire-like) source such
as AP, Reuters, or Tass. Typically, these articles are either
location specific (U.S., Russia, Europe, etc.) or political ide-
ology specific (Conservative, Liberal).
Below we show some representative example stories that
stayed within their origin community. We highlight each
source name with the community they belong to in Figure 1
for easy referencing.
• Tass - Russian fighter jet armed with Kinzhal hypersonic
missiles to hold demonstration flights - copied verbatim
by The Russophile .
• AP - Nevada could elect first-ever female-majority
statehouse - copied verbatim by Talking Points Memo ,
Mail , and CBS News - copied partially by
The Guardian and USA Today .
• France24 - France to set penalties on non-recycled plas-
tic next year - copied verbatim by Telesur TV
• The Gateway Pundit - What is She Wearing Hillary
Clinton Looks Like Hell at OzyFest in New York - copied
verbatim by The Drudge Report .
• Alternet - Conservatives have gone fully fact-free So
how the heck do we even talk to them - copied verbatim
by Raw Story .
Content Mixing
The second behavior we find in the data is exactly the op-
posite of echo chambers, namely content mixing. Looking
at Figure 2, we can see the yellow (right-wing/conspiracy)
community copies many articles from all other communi-
ties, particularly the green community (U.S. mainstream).
We also see strong connections between the orange (Rus-
sian/conspiracy) and yellow (right-wing/conspiracy) com-
munities and between the cyan (U.K. mainstream) and green
(U.S. mainstream) communities.
When further examining the connection between the
green and yellow communities, we find that 2038 of the
2477 articles copied from the green community to the yel-
low community are by The Drudge Report and 160 of
these articles are copied by Western Journal. This subtrac-
tion leaves us with only 279 article copies by the other
sources in the yellow community. Most of the 279 excess
articles copied from the mainstream community to the right-
wing/conspiracy community are speeches by Donald Trump
or reporting about something Donald Trump said, which is
ultimately copied verbatim.
While this content mixing between mainstream and right-
wing/conspiracy is not as wide-spread as it initially seems,
the content mixing that does happen is salient. According to
SimilarWeb6, The Drudge Report had 138.34M visits in De-
cember 2018 and Western Journal had 31.77M visits in De-
cember 2018, both with over 90% of that traffic coming from
the United States. According to Alexa7, both sites were in
the top 150 sites visited in the United States. This high read-
ership means that many people are seeing legitimate news
articles next to false conspiracy theory articles, potentially
creating a warped-view of current events. Furthermore, the
employment of so many well-sourced articles may boost the
sites’ apparent credibility, potentially helping them spread
false or misleading information to new readers.
Content mixing between the right-wing/conspiracy and
Russian/conspiracy is much more diverse. Specifically, we
see several strong connections between the communities.
First, Infowars, Prison Planet, and Newswars form a strongly
connected triad that crosses the two communities (with In-
6www.similarweb.com(accessed1/12/2019)
7www.alexa.com (accessed 1/12/2019)
fowars in right-wing/conspiracy and the other two in Rus-
sian/conspiracy). As it turns out, all three sites are ran by
the famous conspiracy theorist Alex Jones. More interest-
ingly, all three sources are important in news production
in their communities, as all 3 sources show up in the k-
core of their communities. Furthermore, all three copy from
Russian state-sponsored media such as RT and Sputnik and
are copied from by U.S. right-wing sources such as The
Gateway Pundit. There are several others sources that cross
between the communities, including The D.C. Clothesline,
Natural News, The Russophile, and sottnet. The connection
between these two communities will be made more even
more clear in our next case study.
We see a similar level of diverse content mixing between
the U.K. mainstream and U.S. mainstream communities, but
this is to be expected as both are almost completely well-
known mainstream sources and content sharing in main-
stream media has been studied in depth (Boczkowski 2010).
Competing Narratives
Another common finding in the data is competing narratives.
Specifically, we often see that news articles are not shared
(verbatim or partial) across communities, but the event or
topic often is. In other words, completely different articles
are written based on the same event and are published in sev-
eral different news communities, ultimately creating various
narratives around a broad event. These competing narratives
are often repeatedly shared in the alternative news commu-
nities, sometimes multiple times by the same source. This
behavior is very similar to the competing narrative behav-
ior surrounding the role of the Syria Civil Defence (White
Helmets) shown in (Starbird et al. 2018).
A prime example of this in our data is during the Ka-
vanaugh Hearings 8. On September 22nd, it was announced
by Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s lawyers that she would testify
in front of the U.S. Senate about accused sexual assault by
Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh. This event had
widespread media attention as Kavanaugh’s nomination had
heavily partisan support and opposition, to which the sexual
assault allegations added to.
In our data set, we can see that this event was not only
reported widely, but had many different narratives spreading
outside the mainstream media. To illustrate this, we provide
some examples of stories spreading around the time of
Dr. Ford agreeing to testify. Below we list the articles
announcing this event and what news producers either
partially or fully used the content. Again, we highlight each
source with the community they belong to in Figure 1.
• Reuters - Kavanaugh accuser agrees to testify in Sen-
ate hearing - verbatim copied by OANN . - partially
copied by NPR , CBS News , USA Today , Fortune ,
Mother Jones , Politicus USA , and The Russophile .
8en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brett_Kavanaugh_Su
preme_Court_nomination#Sexual_assault_allega
tions
• AP - Kavanaugh accuser commits to hearing - copied
verbatim by Mail , Drudge Report - copied partially by
PBS , The Denver Post , ABC News , Mercury News ,
and The Independent .
Immediately after this event was announced, many com-
peting narratives were spread at the same time in different
communities, many of which were fact-checked as false by
Politifact9 and Snopes10. We list examples of these below:
• Natural News - BOMBSHELL Christine Blasey Fords
letter to Sen Dianne Feinstein revealed to be a total
FAKE - copied verbatim by The D.C. Clothesline and
The Russophile
• Natural News - Kavanaugh accuser Christine Blasey
Ford ran mass hypnotic inductions of psychiatric subjects
- copied verbatim by The Russophile - copied partially
by HumansAreFree .
• The Gateway Pundit - Christine Blasey Fords High
School Yearbook Was Scrubbed to Hide Culture
of Racism Binge Drinking - copied partially by
Natural News , The Right Scoop , True Pundit ,
The Russophile , and Sign of the Times (sottnet).
• Hot Air - Hmmm Ford hires former Clinton Biden
adviser as potential hearing sherpa as attorneys bar-
gain for - copied partially by The Gateway Pundit and
Sign of the Times (sottnet)
• The Gateway Pundit - Far Left Activist and Ka-
vanaugh Accuser Christine Blasey Ford Spotted at Anti-
Trump March in LA VID - copied partially by The
Political Insider and True Pundit .
• The Gateway Pundit - Christine Blasey Fords Com-
plete List of Lies and Misrepresentations Related to
Judge Kavanaugh - copied partially by LewRockwell ,
The Russophile .
• The Gateway Pundit - Women Support Judge Brett Ka-
vanaugh Criticize Accuser Dr Christine Blasey Ford -
copied partially by Prison Planet and The Daily Caller .
Several of these stories where later fact-checked as false.
This example illustrates not only the speed of false/hyper-
partisan story creation, but the amplification of these stories
through content sharing. In this small example, we see 7 dif-
ferent narratives discrediting Dr. Ford before she could even
testify. These 7 narratives were all copied multiple times
through out both the conspiracy communities.
We found similar behavior before this event, when the
Washington Post revealed Christine Blasey Ford was the ac-
cuser. In addition there were many smaller examples of this
behavior in the data.
9www.politifact.com
10www.snopes.com
Counter-narratives
Lastly, we see a more unique case in our data, which we
will call (for lack of a better term) counter-narratives. On
November 27th, 2018, The Guardian published a story al-
leging that Paul Manafort, former campaign manager to
President Donald Trump, held a secret meeting with Ju-
lian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, inside the Ecuado-
rian embassy. This story, if true, was considered potentially
the biggest story of the year11 due to its far reaching im-
plications. However, the story was criticized by other well-
reputed sources for relying on anonymous sources, not pro-
viding any verifiable details, and being, in general, unbe-
lievable given the high level of surveillance in the area sur-
rounding the embassy12. The report has been denied by both
Manafort and Assange. Additionally, the story was edited
by The Guardian multiple times within five hours, weaken-
ing the language surrounding the claims. Five weeks after
its publication, Glenn Greenwald, a renowned investigative
journalist has reported that the story remains unverified13.
Yet, The Guardian has not retracted the article or demon-
strated any further investigation to verify the report.
This story spread widely in the news ecosystem, spanning
all communities. Specifically, we find the following links in
our data:
• The Guardian - Manafort held secret talks
with Assange in Ecuadorian embassy sources
say - copied verbatim by Drudge Report and
The Russophile - copied partially by Alternet ,
Daily Kos , Crooks and Liars , Raw Story , CNN ,
The Huffington Post , Yahoo News , Mother Jones ,
Chicago Sun-Times , The Hill , USA Today , Mail
The Independent , Politicus USA , Hot Air , and
MSNBC .
This story was also reported by several other mainstream
sources, but they did not show up in our partial copy analy-
sis. Our dataset contains verbatim copying of both the origi-
nal and modified versions of this article.
While the wide spread of a still unconfirmed story is
alarming, as it breaks strongly-held journalist standards, the
bigger concern is the aftermath. In the following days, the
heavily conspiracy-based communities published and spread
the following articles:
• LewRockwell - The Assange-Manafort Fabricated
Story - copied verbatim by The Russophile and
Sign of The Times (sott.net).
• Natural News - WOW The Guardian reporters of bo-
gus Manafort-Assange meetings accused of faking stories
about WikiL - copied partially by Mint Press News ,
11vanityfair.com/news/2018/11/the-guardia
n-paul-manafort-julian-assange
12fair.org/home/misreporting-manafort-a-cas
e-study-in-journalistic-malpractice/
13theintercept.com/2019/01/02/five-weeks-a
fter-the-guardians-viral-blockbuster-assan
gemanafort-scoop-no-evidence-has-emerged-j
ust-stonewalling/
• Natural News - The Guardian caught publishing com-
pletely fake news - copied partially by The Duran
• The Gateway Pundit - Guardian Stealth Edits Junk Re-
port to Save Their Ass After Assange-Manafort Fic-
tion Crumbles - copied verbatim by Prison Planet and
Newswars .
• The Gateway Pundit - IT WAS A HOAX Guardian Re-
port Blows Up Manafort Passport Shows NO UK TRIPS
Never Met with Assange
• Russia-Insider - Greenwald Goes Ballistic on Politi-
cos Theory That Guardians Assange-Manafort Story
Was Planted - copied verbatim by Mint Press News ,
The Russophile , Sign of The Times (sott.net)
• 21stCenturyWire - Wikileaks Rips Guardians Manafort-
Assange Report by Serial Fabricator Offers Million Dol-
lar Challenge - copied verbatim by The Russophile
• Sputnik - As Guardians Manafort-Assange Story Ex-
posed as Fake Ex-CIA Agent Blames Russia
• True Pundit - The Guardian Faceplants As Manaforts
Passport Stamps Dont Match Fabricated Assange Story
• Daily Stormer - Manafort DID NOT Visit Julian As-
sange The Guardian Made it All Up
At the surface level, these articles seem to be pushing the
standard conspiracy narrative that “the mainstream media is
the fake media,” but in this case their narrative seems to be
justified, as the mainstream media is still debating the relia-
bility of The Guardian article. This example illustrates how
a small breach of journalistic standards can cause increased
uncertainty of what news sources to trust, which ultimately
takes power away from the proper news and gives power to
conspiracy theorist. Due to the limited attention and infor-
mation overload of consumers (Qiu et al. 2017), this small
shift in power may be enough to erode trust.
7 Conclusions
In conclusion, we find that content sharing happens in tightly
formed communities, and these communities represent rel-
atively homogeneous portions of the media landscape. We
characterize these communities using expert labeling from
four independent assessment sites as well as the country
the source is based in. We find many of the same behav-
iors described in previous studies (Starbird 2017; Horne and
Adalı 2018). Specifically, we find that both news-wire-like
services and news aggregation services exist in both alter-
native and mainstream news communities. We find that al-
ternative news sources repeatedly share content about com-
peting contemporaneous narratives, which can erode trust in
the mainstream media as well as cause uncertain surround
current events. We also discover mainstream and conspiracy
content mixing by several highly read sources in the right-
wing community, which can create a false sense of credibil-
ity for otherwise not credible sources. In general, our results
show that the news is homogeneous within communities and
diverse in-between, creating different spirals of sameness.
These different spirals have multiple sources working si-
multaneously to amplify alternative narratives about current
events as well as to undermine the credibility of some high
quality news outlets.
8 Limitations and Future Work
Our goal in this paper was to explore a large-scale view of
the news ecosystem, but we recognize our data only covers
the English speaking world, and certainly may be incom-
plete. We do not include local news papers in this study,
which also contribute to this environment. Furthermore, we
do not fully understand the motives behind much of the con-
tent sharing. While some of it may be meant for malicious
amplification of fake news, some of it also may be cause by
“useful idiots (Zannettou et al. 2018).” These motivations
may be hard if not impossible to assess from the outside
of these organizations. In addition, the sources used to la-
bel sources in the network are incomplete, leaving a lot of
data unlabeled, particularly sources from outside the United
States. A better understanding of the credibility of these un-
labeled sources may help in future analysis.
In this paper, we did not fully explore the paths created
by partial content sharing. For future work, we would like to
refine the partial content matching algorithm and continue
analysis using it. While the partial sharing cases described
in this study were fairly straight-forward, there are many in-
teresting and under-studied cases of real news content being
mixed with fake news content. These types of partial copies
were not addressed in this paper.
Lastly, we recognize that the operationalization of shar-
ing may conflate different copying behaviors, such as large
quote copying. We attempt to limit this potential conflation
by using only verbatim copying in the network construc-
tion, which means only fully quote articles, like Presidential
speeches, are included in the network. Despite this fix, we
would like to find a more sophisticated solution to disam-
biguating this in future work.
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